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Abstract
Information-theoretic secure key agreement protocols do not use computational assumptions and will
stay secure with future advances in computing technologies. We consider a setting where Alice and Bob have
access to correlated variables, and use a public channel to interact and obtain a shared secret key. Efficiency
of protocols in this setting is measured by the secret key rate which is asymptotically upper bounded by the
secret key capacity of the setting. Recently a tight bound for key rate in finite length regime was derived
and an optimal protocol that achieves the asymptotic and finite length bounds was proposed. The protocol,
however, requires many rounds of interactions. In this paper, we propose a noninteractive protocol with
optimal asymptotic and near-optimal finite length performance. We prove security and efficiency of the
protocol and give a modified version of the protocol that significantly improves computation cost of the
parties by sacrificing some of the key rate. We show how this trade-off is achievable by controlling the
parameters of the system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of the Internet today relies on key agreement protocols such as Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol or RSA based key agreement that rely on the difficulty of two computational
problems: discrete logarithm and integer factorization. Peter Shor [1] gave efficient quantum algo-
rithms for both of these problems which means one need to re-think the cryptographic infrastructure
of the Internet in presence of a quantum computer. Recent developments in quantum technologies
have led to the recent announcement by security agencies [2] for the need to move to quantum-safe
cryptography, resulting in a flurry of research and standardization efforts [3]–[5] in this domain.
Quantum-safe cryptography can be based on computational assumptions such as the hardness of
a general decoding problems, for which no efficient quantum algorithm is known yet, or without
such computational assumptions and using physical layer assumptions instead. For key agreement,
the first approach has resulted in protocols with high computation and communication costs [4], [5]
that may not be suitable for resource constrained devices. In this paper, we use the latter approach,
pioneered by Wyner [6], and widely studied ever since [7]–[10].
We consider the problem of secret key agreement between two parties. This is a fundamental
problem in cryptography, and is the necessary first step for using symmetric key algorithms such
as AES encryption. In the source model of key agreement, Alice and Bob have samples of two
correlated random variables X and Y , respectively, and an eavesdropper Eve, has side-information
in the form of a third correlated random variables Z. Alice and Bob interact over a reliable public
channel that is visible to Eve with the goal of extracting a secret shared key. This setting was
first independently considered by Maurer [8] and Ahlswede and Csisza´r [11], and has been widely
studied and extended to multi-user setting [12]. Efficiency of a secret key agreement protocol when
Alice, Bob and Eve have n samples of X, Y , and Z, respectively, is measured by the secret key
rate (achievable key length divided by n) of the protocol. The highest asymptotic (n → ∞) key
rate that can be achieved in a setting, is the secret key capacity of the setting. It was proved [11]
that, if random variables (X, Y, Z) form a Markov Chain (i.e., PXY ZPY = PXY PY Z), then secret
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key capacity of the source model is given by I(X;Y |Z), the mutual information between X and
Y , given Z.
This bound is not tight for finite values of n and cannot be used to evaluate and compare protocols
in finite length regime. In [13], Hayashi et al. gave a tight upper bound on the key length for finite
number of samples (n). This result is particularly important in practice where n is given, allowing
protocols to be evaluated and compared. Hayashi et al., also gave an interactive protocol that is
(i) asymptotically capacity achieving, and (ii) for a fixed n achieves the tight finite length upper
bound. The protocol, however, requires O(n) rounds of interaction which means it will have very
limited application in practice for typical values of key length and respective n.
Our Work. We present a noninteractive secret key agreement protocol that uses a single one-
way communication to establish the shared key. The protocol (asymptotically) achieves secret key
capacity, and for finite values of n achieves a secret key with length close to the optimal value;
that only differs from the optimal value in the coefficient of the second order term (O(
√
n)- See
expression in Theorem 1).
Compared to [13] which is the only known optimal protocol, our proposed protocol has a number
of notable advantages, (a) it has more efficient initialization (using hash functions instead of random
binning), (b) it uses a singel transmission and does not require interaction; and (c) has significantly
less communication.
We also consider the application of the protocol in a wireless setting where the correlated variables
are generated by using a random beacon: Bob broadcasts a random string (random beacon) that
is received by Alice through a noisy channel. Eve who is also at the reception distance, receives
the beacon through a second independent channel. This setting is easily realizable in IoT settings
with transmission using Bluetooth or WiFi technologies. We model the receiver and eavesdropper’s
channel as Binary Symmetric Channels (BSC) with different noise levels, calculate the secret key
capacity of the setting, and estimate the key length for a finite n.
We observe that the computation cost of one of the nodes (Bob) grows exponentially with n and
thus we modify the protocol to significantly decrease computation, at the cost of somewhat lower
secret key rate. We reprove security and reliability and give explicit expressions for calculating the
parameters of the modified protocol. The modified protocol is outlined in Section IV. Finally we
present our numerical results that shows for a realistic setting and for obtaining keys with lengths
64, 80, or 128 bits, how one should find the appropriate design parameters of the protocol.
Related Works. Secret key agreement in source model was independently studied in [8], [11]. Key
agreementin channel model where the correlation between parties is obtained through transmission
over noisy channels is considered in [11]. In the application scenario of Section IV, we also use
noisy channel for generation of correlated randomness.
Tyagi and Watanabe [14] used the relation between secret key length and binary hypothesis
testing to obtain a tight upper bound on the secret key length in a finite block length setting.
We note that, quantum-safe key agreement using computational assumptions have also been
intensively studied [4], [5], [15]. Physical layer security provides a complementary approach that
can be used by itself, or in a hybrid construction in combination with a computationally secure
protocol to improve security.
Organization. Background, the model and the system setting are given in Section II. Our proposed
SKA protocol is in Section III. The protocol application in a practical scenario is in Section IV.
Our numerical results are discussed in Section V and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Notations. We denote random variables (RVs) with upper-case letters, (e.g., X), and their realiza-
tions with lower-case letters, (e.g., x). Calligraphic letters to show the alphabet of a random variable
(e.g., X ). X = Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) is a vector of n random variables, and its instantiation is given
by x = xn = (x1, . . . , xn). The set X n is the n times Cartesian product of X . An information
source X is IID if for any n > 0, the sequence of n source outputs, X1, . . . , Xn, are independent
and identically distributed. The sequence is called n−IID sample.
All logarithms in this paper are in base 2. (Shannon) Entropy of a random variable X over
alphabet X is defined as H(X) = −∑x PX(x) logPX(x); conditional entropy of a pair of random
variable X and Y is defined by H(X|Y ) = −∑x,y PXY (x, y) logPX|Y (x|y), and their mutual
information is given by I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ). The conditional mutual information between
X and Y given Z, is I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y, Z).
Random variables (X, Y, Z) satisfy Markov relation denoted by X − Y − Z if and only if
PXY Z(x, y, z)PY (y) = PXY (x, y)PY Z(y, z). If the Markov relation X − Y − Z holds, we have
I(X;Y |Z) = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y ).
The statistical distance between two discrete random variables X and Y with probability dis-
tributions PX and PY over alphabet W , is denoted by SD(X;Y ) and is given by, SD(X;Y ) =∑
w∈W 1/2 |PX(w)− PY (w)| .
A family {hs|s ∈ S} of functions hs : X → Y is a 2-Universal Hash Family (2-UHF [16]) if
for any x 6= x′ , Pr{hS(x) = hS(x′)} ≤ 1/|Y|, where the probability is over the uniform choices of
S ∈ S.
An example of a 2-UHF is the multiplicative hash family Hn,tmult :{0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}t that
for a seed s ∈ {0, 1}n \ 0n, and an input x ∈ {0, 1}n, outputs Hn,ts (x) = x s|t, which is the first
t bits of x  s. Here  is multiplication over the finite field GF (2n). The Leftover Hash Lemma
(LHL) [17] states that a 2-UHF family can extract randomness from a source (random variable)
with a lower bound on its min-entropy [17, lemma 3.1]. The average-case version of LHL is given
in [18].
Model and Definitions. In the source model of secret key agreement (SKA) [8], [11] legitimate
parties have samples of a source of randomness, and use a public authenticated channel to arrive
at a shared key. Let Alice and Bob have access to correlated RVs X and Y , and Eve has the
side-information Z about (X, Y ). The joint distribution PXY Z is publicly known. Alice and Bob
use communication over a public authenticated channel to arrive at a shared key K. Let F denote
the set of messages that are communicated over the public channel, and seen by Eve.
During the initialization phase of the protocol Alice and Bob agree on protocol parameters. The
key agreement part has two phases: (i) information reconciliation where the two parties arrive at
a common random string, and (ii) privacy amplification where a common secret key is extracted
from the shared string.
Definition 1. A key agreement protocol with public communication F , and key extraction functions
Kx(X,Ux,F ) and Ky(Y, Uy,F ) in the above setting, obtains an (, σ)-Secret Key (in short (, σ)-
SK) with length log |K|, if there is a random variable K over K that satisfies the following
properties:
(reliability) Pr {Kx = Ky = K} ≥ 1− , (1)
(security) SD ((K,F , Z); (U,F , Z)) ≤ σ, (2)
where U is sampled uniformly from K, and Ux and Uy are uniformly distributed local random
variables.
This is the strongest security requirement for secret key agreement protocols in an information-
theoretic setting that allows application of the key in practice and together with other cryptographic
primitives (e.g. an encryption system) [19].
Efficiency of an SKA protocol with respect to the correlated randomness (X, Y, Z) is in terms
of the secret key length.
Definition 2. For given (X, Y, Z) and reliability and secrecy parameters (, σ), the supremum of
all key lengths achievable by any (, σ)-SKA protocol is denoted by S,σ(X, Y |Z).
Key Rate of a Protocol. Let the public distribution PXY Z sampled n times, and Alice, Bob and
Eve, each have a vector of n samples of their corresponding RV, X = Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn),
Y = Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn) and Z = Zn = (Z1, . . . , Zn), respectively. The secret key rate of an SKA
protocol that achieves a key length `(n) is given by, R(n) = `(n)/n, and the (asymptotically)
achievable secret key rate of the protocol family is given by, R∗ = lim infn→∞ `(n)/n.
Definition 3 ( [12], [13]). For a given source model (X,Y,Z), the secret key capacity is defined
by
Cs(X, Y |Z) = sup
n,σn
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
Sn,σn(X
n, Y n|Zn), (3)
where the supremum is over all reliability and secrecy parameters n, σn, such that lim
n→∞
(n+σn) =
0.
When the source satisfies the Markov relation X − Y − Z, and (Xn, Y n, Zn) are n−IID copies
of the source, it is proved that the secret key capacity is given by Cs(X, Y |Z) = I(X;Y |Z) [8],
[11].
III. A ONE-ROUND SKA PROTOCOL
We consider the source model setting, and assume Alice, Bob and Eve have their corresponding
components of an n−IID source (Xn, Y n, Zn). Alice and Bob choose their desired secrecy and
reliability parameters, and two 2-UHFs hs : X n → {0, 1}t and hˆs′ : X n → {0, 1}`, where t and `
are determined by n, the source distribution PXY Z , and reliability and secrecy parameters. Alice and
Bob share (over public channel) uniformly random seeds s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S ′ for the two families.
In the rest of this paper we use the multiplicative hash family (See Section II) for the 2-UHF.
At a high level, our SKA protocol (ΠSKA) works as follows: Alice uses the first hash function
to compute the hash value of her samples and sends it to Bob; Bob uses the received hash value,
his samples, and the known probability distribution of the source, to recover Alice’s sample values.
By choosing the hash parameters correctly, he will succeed with high chance. The communicated
hash values will reveal some information to Eve. Alice and Bob remove this leaked information by
applying the second hash function during the privacy amplification (key extraction) phase.
More specifically, to estimate Alice’s vector x, Bob uses the received hash value g = hs(x) and
his own vector y, to create a set of candidate vectors:
T (X|y) = {xˆ : − logPX|Y(xˆ|y) ≤ λ}, (4)
where λ is a parameter that is determined using the distribution, PXY Z , and the chosen reliability
and secrecy parameters. The protocol succeeds if there is a unique xˆ in the list T (X|y), such that
hs(xˆ) = g; it fails otherwise. Note that there is a small probability that the unique recovered vector
is not the same as x. This will contribute to the reliability error. If Bob correctly recovers xˆ = x,
then the secret shared key is k = hˆs′(x). Protocol 1 shows steps of ΠSKA. The choice of parameters
Protocol 1: ΠSKA: A Capacity-achieving SKA
Public Information: PXY Z
Input: n−fold samples x ∈ X n and y ∈ Yn, , δ.
Output: Key estimates kx and ky.
// Initiation Phase
• Alice and Bob, (i) find and share λ, and ` and t for the hash functions hs : X n → {0, 1}t
and hˆs′ : X n → {0, 1}`, (ii) generate and share the seeds s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S ′ for the hash
function.
// Information Reconciliation Phase
1 Alice sends the hash value g = hs(x) to Bob.
2 Bob forms a list of guesses for x,
T (X|y) = {xˆ : − logPX|Y(xˆ|y) ≤ λ}.
3 Bob finds, if exists, a unique xˆ ∈ T (X|y) such that hs(xˆ) = g.
4 if no xˆ was found or xˆ was not unique then
Abort the protocol.
// Key Extraction Phase
5 Alice computes kx = hˆs′(x).
6 Bob computes ky = hˆs′(xˆ).
that guarantee reliability and secrecy of the key at the desired levels, are obtained using the proof
of Theorem 1 that is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Let Alice, Bob and Eve have n−IID samples of (Xn, Y n, Zn), with the known distribu-
tion PXY Z , and assume X , Y , and Z satisfy the Markov relation X − Y − Z. For any , σ < 1, and
′ < σ, ΠSKA, gives an (, σ)-SK with maximum key length, `max = nI(X;Y |Z)−
√
nf()+f ′(, σ),
where f() =
√
2 log(|X |+3)(√log 1/′+√log 2/), is the coefficient of the second order term1,
and f ′(, σ) = 1 + log (σ − ′)2.
Corollary 1. Theorem 1 implies that ΠSKA achieves the secret key capacity, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
(1/n)`max(n) = Cs(X, Y |Z).
The protocol is near optimal in the sense that the second term in the largest achievable key
length of the protocol has the same order (O(n1/2)) as the optimal finite length upper bound, that
is achieved by the interactive protocol of [13].
IV. USING ΠSKA IN PRACTICE
A. The setting
A correlated source can be obtained in many ways. Maurer in [8, Section 2] considered a
setting where a satellite broadcasts a random string that is received by nodes over noisy channels.
We consider a similar setting where one of the nodes broadcasts a random string. This is easily
1The upper bound on secrecy rate is of the form u1n+ u2
√
n+ u0, where u1 and u2 are the coefficients of the first and second
terms.
Zn
Y nCntlr→ Ky
F
Dev→ Kx Eve
Xn
Fig. 1: Controller-to-Device Application Scenario
implementable by using wireless technologies, and has the advantage of naturally generating Markov
related variables.
We consider a central node (e.g. a controller Cntlr) that needs to establish a shared key with a
neighbouring device Dev. Cntlr broadcasts an n−IID random binary string (the sequence can be
generated by a cryptographic pseudo random number generator (PRNG)).
Dev receives Xn and Eve receives Zn through their respective channels. We assume Dev and
Eve are sufficiently apart and their corresponding channels are independent. We model the channels
by binary symmetric channels (BSC’s) with error probabilities qD and qE , where qD is the BER
at Dev’s receiver, and qE is the minimum BER at Eve’s receiver. The BER of a communication
channel is a function of the received signal power, which reduces with the increase in the distance
between the sender and the receiver, and allows the controller to choose its power so that the
required error probability is achieved at the receiving nodes. Note that in the above setting we have
Pr{xn, zn|yn} = ∏nj=1 Pr{xj|yj}Pr{zj|yj}, and thus the Markov relation X − Y − Z holds. We
assume the BERs qE and qD stay unchanged during the protocol execution, and the channels can
be considered time-invariant.
The SK capacity of the above source model [8] is Cs = H(X|Z) −H(X|Y ) = h2(qD ◦ qE) −
h2(qD), where a ◦ b = a(1− b) + b(1− a), and h2(·) is the binary entropy function.
A close investigation shows that the required computation of ΠSKA at the controller side quickly
becomes unwieldy. In the following, we first give an estimation of the computation cost for typical
parameters that supports the above statement, and then propose modifications to the protocol that
improves computational efficiency at the cost of lower SK rates and negligible loss in reliability. The
modified protocol (Π′SKA) has adjustable parameters that effectively allows the designers to adapt
the protocol for their specific setting, and achieve the desired trade-off between the computation
costs and the SK rate.
B. Computation costs
If the protocol ΠSKA is used in the setting of Figure 1, then the computation cost of the parties
are as follows. According to ΠSKA, line 1, the device only calculates a single hash value g = hs(x),
which is then sent to the controller. Using the multiplicative hashing in binary extension fields, the
cost of this computation is of the order O(n log n log log n), where n is the length of x [20]. The
computation of the controller, however, consists of computing |T (X|y)| hash values. In ΠSKA, the
controller (Figure 1) forms the list T (X|y), and finds hash values of all xˆ ∈ T (X|y) to find a
unique xˆ such that hs(xˆ) = g (see ΠSKA, lines 2-4). Assuming the BSC channel setting of Figure 1
Protocol 2: INFRECON (nb, t, α)
Input: nb, t, α
Output: (x,x,‘success’) if Cntlr and Dev can reconcile on x otherwise, (null, null,‘fail’)
• Cntlr broadcasts y $← {0, 1}nb and Dev receives x.
• Cntlr→ Dev: seeds s $← {0, 1}nb
1 Dev → Cntlr: g = s x|t
2 Cntlr forms a list of guesses for x, i.e., T (X|y) = {xˆ ∈ {0, 1}nb | dH(xˆ,y) ≤ α}
3 Cntlr finds a xˆ ∈ T (X|y) such that hs(xˆ) = g.
4 if xˆ was found then r = ‘success’ else r = ‘fail’
5 return (x, xˆ, r)
and qD < 1/2, T (X|y) consists of all vectors xˆ of length n that have Hamming distance d from
the controller’s vector y (dH(y, xˆ) = d), where d satisfies
qdD(1− qD)n−d ≥ 2−λ. (5)
The size of the list is |T (X|y)| =∑dmaxi=0 (ni), where dmax is the largest d that satisfies (5). Using
the bounds in [21], one can see that |T (X|y)| and hence the number of hash value computations
required for the controller, grows exponentially with n, and becomes unwieldy even for typical key
lengths (e.g., 64 bit key).
We suggest two modifications (M1) and (M2) for ΠSKA to decrease the computation cost of the
protocol while preserving the reliability and secrecy of the protocol at the desired level.
C. Modification of ΠSKA
(M1) Trading Reliability to Reduce Computation.
The reliability error Pe in ΠSKA is bounded by the sum of two types of errors: Pr {ξ1} =
Pr {x /∈ T (X|y)} (see Eq. (4)) and Pr {ξ2} = Pr {xˆ ∈ T (X|y), s.t. xˆ 6= x and hs(xˆ) = hs(x)}.
We approximate probabilities of the two errors as follows.
1) Pr {ξ1} ≈ Pr {ξ′1}. Note that Pr {ξ1} corresponds to the case that the controller cannot find
x in its list T (X|y). Instead of searching all vectors in T (X|y), we propose searching only
in a subset of T (X|y) that is of the form T ′(X|y) = {xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n, s.t. dH(xˆ,y) ≤ α}.
Obviously for any α < dmax we have T ′(X|y) ⊂ T (X|y) and due to the error characteristics
of the BSC, we can find a T ′(X|y) such that searching in T ′(X|y) has negligible effect on
Pr {ξ1}, that is Pr {ξ1} ≈ Pr {ξ′1} = Pr {x /∈ T ′(X|y)}. In the following, we show how the
error probability Pr {ξ′1} can become arbitrarily small for sufficiently large α.
2) Pr {ξ2} ≈ 0. This is because Pr {ξ2} corresponds to the collision probability of a universal
hash function, which is negligible in comparison to Pr {ξ1}.
Finding α: Using the above approximations, we have Pe ≤ Pr {ξ′1} = 1 −
∑α
i=0
(
n
j
)
qiD(1 −
qD)
n−i. Thus, for a given reliability level , an appropriate α is found by α = min{α′| 1 −  ≤∑α′
i=0
(
n
i
)
qiD(1− qD)n−i}.
The result of these approximations, is a modified information reconciliation phase used in
Protocol 2 (INFRECON). Note that this approximation is only on reliability of the protocol and
the secrecy level of the constructed key is not affected after this modification.
(M2) Trading Secret Key Rate to Reduce Computation.
In ΠSKA, decreasing n will decrease the computation cost of ΠSKA. To reduce n, the required
block length of ΠSKA, we obtain the desired key by extracting it from the concatenation of Nb
TABLE I: The input parameters of the protocol are: the BERs of the channel between controller and device, qDand the channel
between controller and Eve, qE , desired key length `, failure probability  and secrecy parameter σ of the final key. Note that
`max(Nb, nb, b) = nbNbCS+2 log(σ−Nb′)+log 2b−3.25√nb·Nb·(
√
log 2/b+
√
log 1/′), where CS = h2(qD◦qE)−h2(qD)
(see Theorem 2). The design parameters (red) can be calculated/chosen for any given required parameters (blue) according to the
expressions below.
Parameter Relation
′, Nb Nb · ′ < σ
b, ν ν = min{ν′|
∑ν′
j=Nb
(
ν′
j
) · (1− b)j · bν′−j ≥ 1− }
nb nb = min{n′b| ` ≤ `max(Nb, n′b, b)}
t t = bnb · h2(qD) + 3.28
√
nb · (log 2/b) + log 2/bc
α α = min{α′| ∑α′i=0 (nbi )qDi(1− qD)nb−i ≥ 1− b}
reconciled common strings (i.e., successful outcomes of INFRECON). This reduces n to nb that
satisfies n/Nb < nb < n,. The secret key rate is decreased because Cntlr has to send at least Nb
blocks of length nb and Nb.nb > n. Theorem 2 gives the relation between Nb, nb and the rest of
the parameters of the protocol. The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix B.
Theorem 2. Consider the channel setting of Figure 1. Let Nb and nb be integers, and b, , and σ
be real values in [0, 1]. Then, for any given Nb, nb, b, , and σ, and any ′ < 1 satisfying Nb′ < σ,
one can choose the parameters ν, α, and t according to Table I such that, Π′SKA gives a key
with secrecy level of σ, and maximum length of `max = nbNbI(X;Y |Z)−Nb√nbf(b) + f ′(b, σ),
where f(b) =
√
2 log(|X |+ 3)(√log 1/′ +√log 2/b), is the coefficient of second order term,
and f ′(b, σ) = 1 + log b(σ −Nb′)2.
Combining (M1) and (M2).
The modified protocol (Π′SKA) will work as follows. The controller and the device agree on Nb
and b, where Nb is the number of necessary successful reconciliation blocks, and b is the failure
probability of INFRECON (Protocol 2). We will discuss how to choose Nb and b in the Section V.
During each reconciliation phase, the controller samples nb random bits and sends them to the
device through a noisy channel. Parties then run INFRECON up to ν times, or until Nb blocks are
successfully reconciled. The resulting reconciled binary string (i.e., xˆ’s), will be concatenated. The
final key is extracted from the final concatenated reconciled strings, using the seed s′ that will be
sent by Cntlr to Dev at the end of the Nbth successful run of INFRECON. See Protocol 3.
To ensure that the final key is generated with failure probability less than , the parameters b
and ν should satisfy
∑ν
j=Nb
(
ν
j
) · (1− b)j · ν−jb ≥ 1− .
Selecting the Parameters.
In the setting of Figure 1, suppose the BER of the channel between Cntlr and Dev is qD and between
Cntlr and Eve is qE and `,  and σ are the required length, reliability and secrecy level of the key
agreement protocol, respectively. For secure execution of Π′SKA, one needs to find appropriate
values for Nb, ′, b, ν, nb, t, and α. The values for these parameters can be chosen according to the
expressions in Table I, for the given values of Cs, qD, `, , and σ.
One can void the second modification (M2) by setting Nb to 1. For Nb > 1, the observation
length of parties is at most ν · nb, and nb < n, and ν · nb > n. This means that the achieved
Protocol 3: SKA protocol Π′SKA(`, , σ)
System Public Information: qE and qD
Input: `: Required Key length; (σ,): secrecy and reliability parameters.
Parameters: Nb, nb, ′, b, ν, t, α
Output: Key estimates kx and ky s.t. Pr {kx 6= ky} ≤ , and |kx| = |ky| ≥ `
1 Find Nb, nb, ′, b, ν, t, α using Table I.
// Information Reconciliation Phase
2 flag = 0
3 for j = 1 to ν do
4 (xj, xˆ, r)=INFRECON(nb, t, α)
5 if r = ‘success’ then
6 Dev updates x = (x||xj) // Parties reconcile on xˆ = xj
7 Cntlr updates cs = (cs||xˆ)
8 flag = flag + 1
9 if flag = Nb then break // Length of common string is nb ·Nb
// Key Extraction Phase
10 Cntlr→ Dev: seed s′ $← {0, 1}nb·Nb
11 Dev computes kx = s′  x|`.
12 Cntlr computes ky = s′  cs|`.
secret key rate is decreased from /`n to /`(ν·nb), for a fixed given `. This loss of the rate allows the
computation cost of the protocol to be reduced. For Nb = 1, there will be no loss on the key rate
and the modified protocol will be capacity achieving. Finding the optimum values of the design
parameters is an interesting problem we leave as future work.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section we give a detailed numerical example for ΠSKA and Π′SKA. In our simulation
for the channel setting of Figure 1, we considered two independent AWGN channels and assumed
signal transmission uses 64-QAM modulation over 5GHZ frequency. Assuming the same receiving
antena for the device (Dev) and the adversary (Eve), we let d(Eve, Cntlr) >∼ 5 · d(Dev, Cntlr),
where d(A,B) is the Euclidean distance between points A and B in a plane. For this example, we
assume SNR 4.6 dB and -7.5 dB at Dev and Eve, respectively2. Therefore, the BER for Eve and
Dev are qE = 0.3 and qD = 0.008, respectively. In this example, we show the effect of proposed
modifications in decreasing the required computation for obtaining keys of 64, 80 and 128 bits. The
reliability error  is set to 0.2 and the secrecy parameter is set to 2−(`/2)+1 where ` is the length of
the key.
According to Table I, for given Nb, and b, we can find a suitable value for nb that is the length
of each reconciliation block. For the given parameters, Figure 2 shows variation of nb as a function
of Nb ∈ [1, 100] and b ∈ {0.01, 0.02, . . . , 0.99}. For a fixed Nb the block length nb decreases as
we increase b. Since the number of hash value computations, and hence the computation cost of
Π′SKA, primarily depends on nb, higher values of b are desirable (e.g., 0.9). On the other hand,
for a fixed value of b, there is a value N∗b < 100 for which nb minimizes. Such minimizing N
∗
b ’s,
2The SNR and distance calculations are according to [22, Table 2.1]
TABLE II: The reliability error is set to  = 0.2 and the secrecy parameter is set to σ = 2−(`/2)+1 where ` is the length of the
key. The minimum nb for keys of length ` ∈ {64, 80, 128} and for b = 0.9 is denoted by n∗b and the corresponding minimizing
Nb is denoted by N∗b . For the calculated value of N
∗
b , the appropriate value of ν is the then calculated according to Table I by
ν = min{ν′| ∑ν′j=Nb (ν′j ) · (1− b)j · ν′−jb ≥ 1− }. For each Nb we set ′ = σ/(1.1 ·Nb). The maximum number of hash value
computations for ΠSKA and Π′SKA are denoted by #HVC(Π) and #HVC(Π
′), receptively; and n is the required block length of
ΠSKA for obtaining an (, σ)-SK of length `. Parameters α and t can be calculated using Table I.
` (bits) n #HVC(ΠSKA) N∗b n
∗
b ν #HVC(Π
′
SKA)
64 1187 6.21× 1074 12 809 146 1.28× 1010
80 1430 1.36× 1084 15 966 180 6.52× 1012
128 2131 6.39× 10112 24 1421 278 6.39× 1020
and the corresponding minimum nb, are reported in Table II for b = 0.9 and keys of length 64,
80, and 128 bits. Table II shows that the gain in computational efficiency of Π′SKA in comparison
with ΠSKA is significant.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Physical layer secret key agreement using physical layer assumptions is an attractive alternative
for long-term security. We considered the source model and proposed a capacity achieving one-round
(noninteractive) SKA protocol for n−IID sources. The protocol also generates close to optimal
key length in finite-length regime. We examined the implementation of the protocol in practice
and observed that, despite relatively simple computation of the reconciliation phase, the cost can
become excessive. This motivated us to propose modifications to the protocol to curb this cost
while sacrificing some key rate. Our investigation raises interesting theoretical questions in optimal
generation of a final key from the modified protocol that was described in Sections IV-C, such that
given final security and reliability can be guaranteed. This will be our future work.
Our results also extend to a more general setting where the samples are independent, but do
not have the same probability distribution. Our reconciliation approach can be used in multi-user
settings for obtaining pairwise independent strings between nodes. Another venue for future work
is deriving tight bounds on the communication complexity of optimal rate SKA protocols.
Fig. 2: Calculating block length nb as a function of Nb and b. Here,  = 0.2, σ = 2−(`/2)+1 where ` is the key length, and
′ = σ/(1.1 ·Nb). Channel setting is given by qE = 0.3 and qD = 0.008. See Section V.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Before beginning the proof of the main theorem we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. (Theorem 2 [23]) Let (Xn, Y n) be an n-independent repetition of (X, Y ) with the joint
distribution PXY = PX1Y1 × . . .× PXnYn . Then for any δ ∈ [0, log(|X |)] and (x,y) representing a
random realization according to PXY, we have
Pr
{− logPX|Y(x|y) ≥ H(Xn|Y n) + nδ} ≤ r,
Pr
{− logPX|Y(x|y) ≤ H(Xn|Y n)− nδ} ≤ r,
where r = 2
−nδ2
2 log2(|X|+3)) .
The min-entropy of a distribution is known to give the maximum extractable random bits from
the distribution. However, it is possible to extract more bits by sacrificing the statistical distance
of the final output from the uniform distribution. This is formalized using the notion of −smooth
min-entropy that gives a tight bound on the maximum extractable randomness of a distribution. In
the following, we show that the average conditional min-entropy in the Leftover Hash Lemma of
[18], can be replaced by −smooth average conditional min-entropy.
First, we recall the following definitions. For two random variables X and Y , the −smooth
min-entropy of X given Y is [23]:
H∞(X|Y ) = max
QX′Y ′∈B(PXY )
min
y∈suppPY
min
x∈X
log
PY (y)
QX′Y ′(x, y)
,
where suppPY denotes the support of PY , and B(PXY ) denotes the -ball of non-negative functions
around PXY , that is B(PXY ) = {QX′Y ′ : X ×Y 7→ R+ | 2SD((X, Y ); (X ′, Y ′)) ≤ }. The average
conditional min-entropy is defined as [18]
H˜∞(X|Y ) = − logEPY max
x∈X
PX|Y (x|Y ),
and the −smooth average min-entropy of X given Y is defined as [18]
H˜∞(X|Y ) = max
QX′Y ′∈B(PXY )
H˜∞(X ′|Y ′).
Lemma 2. Let family {hs|s ∈ S} of functions hs : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` be a 2-Universal Hash Family.
Then
SD((S,Z, hS(X)); (S, Z, U`)) ≤ + 1
2
√
2`−H˜∞(X|Z).
Proof. Suppose Xˆ and Zˆ are random variables over {0, 1}n and {0, 1}∗ respectively such that the
joint distribution of Xˆ and Zˆ is QXˆZˆ , where QXˆZˆ ∈ B(PXZ) and maximizes H˜∞(X|Z). Since
QXˆZˆ ∈ B(PXZ), we have SD(Z; Zˆ) ≤ , and SD(X; Xˆ) ≤ 2 ; and thus, SD(hS(X);hS(Xˆ)) ≤ 2 .
Therefore, we have
SD((S,Z, hS(X)); (S,Z, U`))
≤ SD((S,Z, hS(X)); (S,Z, hS(Xˆ)))
+ SD((S,Z, hS(Xˆ)); (S, Zˆ, hS(Xˆ))
+ SD((S, Zˆ, hS(Xˆ)); (S,Z, U`))
≤ 
2
+

2
+
1
2
√
2`−H˜∞(Xˆ|Zˆ)
≤ + 1
2
√
2`−H˜∞(X|Z).
A relation between smooth average conditional min-entropy and smooth conditional min-entropy
is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. For any  > 0 and arbitray RVs X and Y , we have
H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ H∞(X|Y ).
Proof. We start with the left hand side of the above relation:
H˜∞(X|Y ) = max
QX′Y ′∈B(PXY )
− logEPY ′ maxx QX′|Y ′(x|y)
(a) ≥ max
QX′Y ′∈B(PXY )
− logmax
y
max
x
QX′|Y ′(x|y)
= max
QX′Y ′∈B(PXY )
min
x,y
log
QY ′(y)
QX′Y ′(x, y)
= max
QX′Y ′∈B(PXY )
min
x,y
(
log
PY (y)
QX′Y ′(x, y)
+ log
QY ′(y)
PY (y)
)
(b) ≥ H∞(X|Y ) + max
QY ′∈B(PY )
min
y
log
QY ′(y)
PY (y)
(c) ≥ H∞(X|Y ),
where (a) is due to the fact that for any RV J , EPJ{J} ≤ maxj J , and (b) is due to the definition
of smooth conditional min-entropy, and (c) is due to the choice of QY ′(y) = PY (y).
Now we prove Theorem 1:
Proof. First, we bound the failure probability (Pe = Pr {Ky 6= Kx}) of the protocol. There are two
possibilities contributing to the failure of the protocol:
ξ1 = {x /∈ T (X|y)} = {x : − logPX|Y(x|y) > λ},
ξ2 = {x ∈ T (X|y) : ∃ xˆ ∈ T (X|y) s.t. F (xˆ) = F (x)}.
The error probability is bounded by the probability of these two sets
Pe ≤ Pr {ξ1}+ Pr {ξ2} .
Let λ = H(Xn|Y n) + nδ, where 
2
= 2
−nδ2
2 log2(|X|+3)) , then
ξ1 = {x : − logPX|Y(x|y) > H(Xn|Y n) + nδ}.
Therefore, according to Lemma 1, Pr {ξ1} ≤ 2 . We now bound Pr {ξ2}. Due to definition of
universal hash functions, and by the union bound, Pr {ξ2} ≤ |T (X|y)| · 2−t. Again, by the union
bound we have |T (X|y)| ≤ 2λ. Let t = λ + log 2

, then we have Pr {ξ2} ≤ 2 . By the above
argument, Pe is bounded as follows:
Pe ≤ 
2
+

2
= .
Second, we prove that the output key of our proposed protocol satisfies the secrecy condition,
with secrecy level σ. Recall that the output key of the protocol is K = hˆS′(X). From Lemma 2,
SD((hˆS′(X), S
′,Z); (U`, S ′,Z)) ≤ ′ + 1
2
√
2`−H˜
′
∞(Xn|Zn)
and using [13, Lemma 4]
SD((hˆS′(X), hS(X), S
′, S,Z); (U`, hS(X), S ′, S,Z)) ≤ ′ + 1
2
√
2t+`−H˜
′
∞(Xn|Zn).
From Lemma 3, and [23, Theorem 1] we have H˜′∞(X
n|Zn) ≥ H′∞(Xn|Zn) ≥ H(Xn|Zn)−nδ′,
where ′ = 2
−nδ′2
2 log2(|X|+3) . Therefore,
SD((hˆS′(X), hS(X), S
′, S,Z); (U`, hS(X), S ′, S,Z)) ≤ ′ + 1
2
√
2t+`−H(Xn|Zn)+nδ′ .
Let ′ + 1
2
√
2t+`−H(Xn|Zn)+nδ′ ≤ σ, which gives us σ-secrecy for the key agreement protocol.
Hence, the derived key has secrecy level of σ, if the length of the key satisfies
` ≤ H(Xn|Zn)− nδ′ − t+ 2 + 2 log(σ − ′).
Note that,
′ = 2
−nδ′2
2 log2(|X|+3) ⇔ (log ′)(2 log2(|X |+ 3)) = −nδ′2 ⇔ δ′ =
√
(log 1
′ )(2 log
2(|X |+ 3))
n
.
Also, from the first part of this proof, t = λ+log 2

= H(Xn|Y n)+nδ+log 2

. Thus, the maximum
achievable key length of the protocol is
`max = H(X
n|Zn)−H(Xn|Y n) + 1 + log (σ − ′)2
−
√
2n log(|X |+ 3)(
√
(log
1
′
) +
√
(log
2

)), (6)
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Here, we prove that the secret key obtained by the modified protocol Π′SKA, satisfies the
secrecy condition with secrecy level of σ. Remember that, the final key is extracted from XNb , which
is the concatenation of Nb common strings, i.e., XNb = (X1|| · · · ||XNb). That is K = hˆS′(XNb). For
the reconciliation of each common string Xj , a random seed Sj , and a hash value Gj is sent over
the public channel. Let SNb and GNb denote the collection of all random seeds, and corresponding
hash values, respectively; i.e., SNb = (S1, . . . , SNb), and G
Nb = (G1, . . . ,GNb).
From [13, Lemma 4] we have
SD((hˆS′(X
Nb),GNb , S ′, SNb ,ZNb); (U`,GNb , S ′, SNb ,ZNb)) ≤ Nb′ + 1
2
√
2Nbt+`−NbH˜
′
∞(Xnb |Znb ),
and by Lemma 3, and [23, Theorem 1], we get
SD((hˆS′(X
Nb),GNb , S ′, SNb ,ZNb); (U`,GNb , S ′, SNb ,ZNb)) ≤
Nb
′ +
1
2
√
2Nbt+`−NbH(Xnb |Znb )+Nbnbδ′ ,
where δ′ =
√
nb−1(log 1′ )(2 log
2(|X |+ 3)). Since the failure probability of each reconciliation is
set to be b, we choose t = H(Xnb|Y nb)+nbδ+log 2b , where δ =
√
nb−1(log 1b )(2 log
2(|X |+ 3)).
Thus, the final key has secrecy level of σ if the output key length of the modified protocol satisfies
` ≤ Nb(H(Xnb|Znb)−H(Xnb|Y nb)) + 1 + log b(σ −Nb′)2
−Nb
√
2nb log(|X |+ 3)(
√
(log
1
′
) +
√
(log
2
b
)), (7)
which completes the proof.
